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Louisiana Civil Procedure
Howard W. L'Enfant*
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM
In Lemke v. Lemke,' the parties had been married in Louisiana in the early
1960s and had been divorced in Alabama in 1982, where they were living at the
time. The plaintiff moved back to Louisiana and in 1985 filed an action to make
the Alabama judgment executory and also sought back-due child support and
alimony based on an agreement incorporated in the Alabama judgment. Service
of process was made under the Long-Arm statute' on the defendant in Georgia.
The defendant's exception of lack of jurisdiction was overruled, and a default
judgment was confirmed. On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed that the trial
court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on R.S. 13:3201(A)(6),
which provides that a Louisiana court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident as to a cause of action arising from the nonresident's "[n]on-support
of a child, parent, or spouse ... domiciled in this state to whom an obligation
of support is owed and with whom the non-resident formerly resided in this
state."' 3 The trial court had based its finding that the parties had formerly
resided in this state on the plaintiff's testimony that there had been two occasions
when they had lived in Louisiana for several months and that during one of these
stays their children had been enrolled in Louisiana schools. The court of appeal
held that these facts were sufficient to uphold personal jurisdiction under the
statute.
Although the result reached by the court of appeal may be correct, the
approach used to reach that result raises some questions. The determination of
whether Louisiana can assert jurisdiction over a nonresident involves a double
inquiry: the facts of the case must fit within the provisions of the Long-Arm
statute,4 and the assertion of jurisdiction must comply with the due process
standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The court in Lemke complied with
the first requirement but not the second. There was no discussion of whether the
assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would violate traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.6 Such an inquiry would focus on the
plaintiffs interest in litigating these issues in Louisiana, the state's interest in
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Henry Plauch6 Dart Professor of Law
1. 616 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 619 So. 2d 1066 (1993).
2. La. R.S. 13:3201, 3204 (1991).
3. La. R.S. 13:3201(A)(6) (1991).
4. This applies when the court is using subsection A of the statute as the court did in this case.
The assertion of jurisdiction under subsection B would involve only a due process analysis.
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct.
154 (1945); McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So. 2d 429 (La. 1987).
6. International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154; McBead Drilling, 509 So. 2d 429.
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providing a forum to adjudicate these issues based on the domicile of the parent
and children in this state, and the possible burden on the defendant of presenting
a defense in Louisiana.7 But even if the plaintiffs interest is strong, and the
state's interest is strong, and the burden on the defendant is slight, the state still
cannot assert jurisdiction unless it finds that the defendant has the requisite
minimum contact with the state in the form of deliberate, purposeful activity
whereby he invoked the privilege and protection of the state, thereby allowing
the state to impose the burden of defending the action upon the defendant.8 It
may be that an analysis of the facts of this case would show that the assertion
of jurisdiction would comply with the requirements of due process, but the
important point is that such an analysis must be made. To illustrate that it is not
enough to determine whether the facts fit within the terms of the statute, let us
examine two hypothetical situations. In the first, let us assume that the Lemkes
had married in Louisiana in the 1960s and had lived the twenty years of their
married life in Louisiana before the defendant moved to Georgia. In the second
case, let us assume that the Lemkes were married in Louisiana in the 1960s,
spent a couple of months in Louisiana right after their marriage, and then spent
the rest of their twenty years of married life in Georgia before the wife returned
to Louisiana. Both of these cases fit the statute because in each case the former
spouse is domiciled in Louisiana and the defendant had formerly resided with the
spouse seeking support in Louisiana, but the results under a due process analysis
arguably could be different. The first presents a strong case for jurisdiction, but
the second does not.9
VENUE
In Succession of Harvey,1 ° the trial court sustained the defendants'
exceptions of improper venue, no right of action, and no cause of action as to
claims filed by the succession representative. On appeal, the court affirmed the
trial court's finding of improper venue, but found that it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court not to transfer these claims to a court of proper
venue."' And the court also ruled that once the trial court had granted the
defendant's exception of improper venue, it was without authority to rule on the
other exceptions; therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court on the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action. It is this
aspect of the court's decision that deserves comment because it contains serious
implications for efficient trial procedures. For this particular case it means that
7. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
8. Id.
9. See Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978).
10. 616 So. 2d 1281 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
11. La. Code Civ. P. art. 121 provides that "[w]hen an action is brought in a court of improper
venue, the court may dismiss the action, or in the interest of justice, transfer it to a court of proper
venue."
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA CIVIL PROCEDURE
after the case is transferred to the proper venue, the defendants will refile their
exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action. If the trial court sustains
one or both of the exceptions and the grounds of the objection cannot be
removed by amendment, then the action shall be dismissed, 2 and the case will
be back in the court of appeal for a final determination of the same issues that
were before the court on the first appeal. In support of its position, the court
cited Favorite v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation3 in which the defendants
had raised exceptions of improper venue and no cause of action. There, the trial
court did not rule on the venue issue, but sustained the exception of no cause of
action and dismissed the action on the grounds that the plaintiff's exclusive
remedy was under the Worker's Compensation Law. The court of appeal
reversed and ruled that an exception of improper venue should always be ruled
on before the court rules on the exception of no cause of action.
The result of the decision in Favorite is that the case is remanded to trial
court for a ruling on venue. If the trial court found that venue was proper, it
would then rule on the exception of no cause of action again and, assuming that
it would follow the prior decision, the exception would be sustained, and the case
would be back before the court of appeal. If the trial court ruled that venue was
improper, could it also rule on the exception of no cause of action? Apparently
not, for the court in Favorite, anticipating the holding in Succession of Harvey,
indicated that the case should be transferred, and that the transferor court should
not rule on the exception of no cause of action because this would create a
situation in which the transferee court might feel bound to follow a ruling by a
co-equal court. The court in Favorite based its decision on what seemed to be
the logical sequence of ruling on the exceptions. The court in Succession of
Harvey went further and held that once the court ruled on improper venue it
lacked authority to rule on the other exceptions. Both of these conclusions need
to be examined.
It is true that there is a logic in the sequence of the exceptions. The
exception that must be filed first is the declinatory exception, which raises
objections such as lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant, and improper venue; its purpose is to test whether the action
has been filed in the proper court.' 4 The next exception, the dilatory exception,
raises objections as to capacity or cumulation, which may delay but not dismiss
the action." The third exception, the peremptory exception, raises objections
such as prescription, no right of action, no cause of action, and res judicata,
which would dismiss the action. 6 It could be argued that the exceptions should
be raised one at a time; that is, the court should consider objections that delay
the action only after it has determined the jurisdictional issues. It could also be
12. La. Code Civ. P. art. 934.
13. 537 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
14. La. Code Civ. P. art. 925.
15. La. Code Civ. P. art. 926.
16. La. Code Civ. P. art. 927.
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argued that the jurisdictional objections should be raised one at a time, that is,
the court should first determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction, and if it
decides that it does, then it should consider objections to jurisdiction over the
defendant and then the issue of venue. But such logic exacts a heavy price in
terms of time and expense. Let me illustrate. Suppose the plaintiff files suit in
city court against a non-resident defendant. The defendant would first object to
subject matter jurisdiction. If it is sustained and the case transferred to a court
with subject matter jurisdiction, 7 the defendant would object to venue. And
again, after transfer, he would object to in personam jurisdiction. The delay and
expense would be further increased by the fact that an appeal could be taken by
the plaintiff from each adverse ruling. To avoid such a result, the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure requires that all objections that can be raised in the
declinatory exception must be raised at the time the declinatory exception is
filed 8 and reinforces this requirement by refusing to allow the declinatory
exception to be amended to raise new objections.' 9 The clear implication of the
requirement that all declinatory objections must be raised at the same time is that
the court must have the authority to rule on all of them. Thus, in our hypotheti-
cal, the city court would rule on all of the objections-lack of subject matter,
lack of in personam jurisdiction, and venue-and a single appeal would bring all
of these issues before the court of appeal for final disposition.
The Code of Civil Procedure also deviates from a strict logical sequence,
again in the interests of judicial efficiency, by requiring that all objections must
be raised together in the dilatory exception 2 and that the dilatory exception
must be filed at the same time as the declinatory exception.2 Further, if the
interests of judicial efficiency are to be served, the trial court should be expected
to rule on all of the objections. The Code of Civil Procedure allows, but does
not require, the peremptory exception to be filed with the declinatory exception
or with the dilatory exception or both.22 Suppose the defendant files a
declinatory exception of improper venue and the peremptory exception of
prescription based on the grounds that service of process occurred after the
prescriptive period. To rule on the objection of prescription, the court must first
determine whether venue is proper because, if venue is proper, filing the action
interrupts prescription; if it is not proper, service of process interrupts prescrip-
tion. But under the decision in Succession of Harvey, once the court determines
that venue is improper, the court cannot rule on the issue of prescription. There
would also be two appeals in this case, one from the ruling on venue and another
from the ruling on prescription. The matter is complicated by the the supreme
17. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4841.
18. La. Code Civ. P. art. 925.
19. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1152.
20. La. Code Civ. P. art. 926.
21. La. Code Civ. P. art. 928.
22. Id.
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court's holding in Foster v. Breaux3 that a defendant must file his objection to
venue along with his objection to prescription because if he does not, he waives
his objection to venue, and with venue now proper, filing interrupts prescription.
The implication of such a requirement is that the trial court has the authority to
rule on both issues. The court in Foster also held as to a co-defendant that the
trial court was no longer competent to try a plea of prescription after it had
sustained an objection to venue. This would seem to support the decisions in
Succession of Harvey and Favorite, but Foster is distinguishable. In Foster, after
the trial court had sustained the objection of venue and the court of appeals had
affirmed that decision, this had the effect of dismissing the suit against that
defendant, and it was the dismissal, not the ruling on venue that deprived the
trial court of its authority to rule on the subsequently filed exception of venue.
24
Succession of Harvey is clearly contrary to the intent of the Code of Civil
Procedure to promote judicial efficiency and to dispose of cases economically
and expeditiously and, hopefully, will not be followed by other courts.
TIME OF PLEADING, DECLINATORY ExCEPTIONS, AND WAIVER BY GENERAL
APPEARANCES
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that the declinatory
exception (and the dilatory exception) shall be filed prior to answer2 and
further provides that when a defendant makes a general appearance, he waives
all objections that may be raised through the declinatory exception (except lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter) unless pleaded therein.26 In Bickhan v.
Sub Sea International, Inc.,27 the defendant filed an answer that included in the
same pleading a declinatory exception of improper venue. Before the court ruled
on the exception, the defendant propounded interrogatories to the plaintiff and
requested the production of documents. The trial court sustained the exception
of improper venue, and on appeal the plaintiff argued that the defendant had
waived its objection to venue by (1) filing it in the same pleading as its answer
and (2) making a general appearance through its discovery requests. The court
of appeal rejected the first argument reasoning that the phrase "unless pleaded
therein" in Article 925 allowed the declinatory exception to be pleaded in the
answer (the general appearance). 8 But it upheld the second argument, holding
that the discovery sought by the defendant went to the merits of the case and
constituted a general appearance under Article 7 and a waiver of the exception
of venue.29 The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the ruling of
23. 270 So. 2d 526 (La. 1972).
24. Id. at 530.
25. La. Code Civ. P. art. 928.
26. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 925, 27.
27. 617 So. 2d 483 (La. 1993).
28. 614 So. 2d 115 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
29. Id.
1994]
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the court of appeal that filing the declinatory exception in the answer was not a
waiver of the exception, but reversed the ruling that seeking discovery was a
general appearance that waived the exception. 3' The supreme court agreed that
the defendant's discovery requests constituted a general appearance that would
have waived any objections raised by the declinatory exception if the actions had
occurred before the venue exception had been filed. The court reasoned that
judicial efficiency is served by the requirement that all declinatory and dilatory
exceptions must be filed prior to answer or general appearance, but found no
useful purpose in extending this requirement to include a general appearance
made after the exception had been filed. The court concluded that its decision
that a subsequent general appearance does not constitute a waiver of a pending
declinatory exception was consistent with the appellate court's decision (with
which it agreed) that the subsequent filing of an answer, before trial of the
exception, does not waive the exception.
This decision is important because it gives a clear rule for defendants to
follow to avoid waiving a declinatory exception. After Bickham, once a
defendant files a declinatory exception, he may file an answer and take other
actions such as filing a peremptory exception without waiving the declinatory
exception. And, maybe more importantly, the defendant may now engage in
discovery without having to wait for the court to rule on the exception.
In Rodrigue v. East Jefferson General Hospital,3 the victim was treated at
East Jefferson General Hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
After a few days she was released to the care of her parents who lived in
Terrebonne Parish. Shortly thereafter, she was hospitalized in the Terrebonne
General Medical Center where she died following liver surgery. A wrongful
death action was filed in Terrebonne Parish against both hospitals and the
treating physicians. The trial court overruled the objection of improper venue
filed by East Jefferson General Hospital and the treating physician there and the
hospital appealed. The court of appeal found that since East Jefferson General
Hospital was a hospital service district, venue was proper at its domicile.32 And
the court further considered whether venue was proper under the statute
governing suits against a political subdivision, which provides that all suits
against a political subdivision shall be brought in the judicial district where the
political subdivision is located or where the cause arises.33 The court found that
all of the wrongful acts by the East Jefferson General Hospital and the treating
physician-the negligent treatment of the patient's heart and liver condi-
tion-occurred in Jefferson Parish and did not give rise to a cause of action
against the hospital in Terrebonne Parish. The court further found that the
malpractice of Terrebonne General Hospital arose from acts that were separate
30. 617 So. 2d 483 (La. 1993).
31. 615 So. 2d 1056 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
32. La. R.S. 46:1063 (1982).
33. La. R.S. 13:5104(B) (1991).
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and distinct from those committed by East Jefferson General Hospital, and that
the two hospitals did not act in concert to cause the death of the victim. The
court concluded that venue for the plaintiff's action against East Jefferson
General Hospital was in Jefferson Parish.
In reaching its conclusion that the cause did not arise in Terrebonne Parish,
the court did not seem to consider the fact that the victim died from a ruptured
liver and delayed rupture of cardiac contusion and that the petition had alleged
that the Jefferson Parish defendants had negligently failed to properly diagnose,
monitor, and treat those same conditions. Furthermore, the last event necessary
to give rise to the plaintiffs cause of action for wrongful death did not occur
until the victim died and, since the death occurred in Terrebonne Parish, it is
reasonable to conclude that the cause of action arose in Terrebonne Parish. The
court of appeal relied on Belser v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance,4 which
held that if any damages are sustained by the plaintiff in the parish where the
wrongful conduct occurred, that parish and only that parish is the parish of
proper venue. Arguably, the case is distinguishable on two grounds. First, in
Belser, a personal injury action, the plaintiff had sustained some injury in East
Baton Rouge Parish, and his condition had worsened in St. Helena Parish over
time. This case is for a wrongful death that occurred in Terrebonne Parish, and
no cause of action existed for these plaintiffs until death occurred. Secondly, the
court in Belser was interpreting the meaning of Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 74, which places venue where the wrongful conduct occurred
or where the damages were sustained, and the court wanted to prevent forum
shopping. In this case, the issue is the meaning of the phrase "in the parish in
which the cause arises, ' 35 and forum shopping is not a concern because a cause
of action for wrongful death can arise only in the parish where the death
occurred. Judicial efficiency and economy would best be served by deciding the
plaintiff's claims against the two sets of defendants in one trial; because much
of the evidence for each claim would be the same, there is a common issue of
causation, and separate trials would create the risk that the absent defendants
would be found to be the cause of the victim's death, thus leaving the plaintiffs
with conflicting and inadequate decisions. It is unfortunate that under the court's
strict reading of the statute, a single trial is not possible in this case. These
concerns were expressed in the concurring opinion, which concluded that this
may be a good case for a legislative exception to the general rules of venue.36
PRESCRIPTION
In Sonnier v. Norwood Construction Co.,37 the plaintiff filed suit on August
34. 509 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
35. La. R.S. 13:5104(B) (1991).
36. Rodrigue v. East Jefferson Hosp., 615 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993)
(__ , J., concurring).
37. 617 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
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3, 1990, against Norwood Construction Company (NCC) to recover for injuries
sustained in an accident on August 4, 1989. The defendant was served and filed
an exception of no cause of action. Service was then made on Norwood
Industrial Painting, Inc. (NIPI), which filed an answer. On November 27, 1990,
the plaintiff filed an amended petition to change the name of the defendant to
Norwood Industrial Painting Company, Inc., which was served. In its answer,
the defendant alleged that its proper name was Norwood Industrial Painting, Inc.
On August 9, 1991, the defendant filed a peremptory exception of prescription,
which was sustained on January 30, 1992. The issue before the court of appeal
was whether the amended petition naming the correct defendant related back to
the filing of the original petition. If it did, then prescription would have been
interrupted. In applying the four factors set forth in Ray v. Alexandria Mall,3"
the court found that the amended claim arose out of the same occurrence set
forth in the original petition-the industrial accident-and that the correct
defendant had received notice so as not to be prejudiced in maintaining a defense
and knew that but for a mistake the action would have been brought against it
originally. In this case, the president of NIPI had been served with the original
petition against NCC and knew that it was a suit against NIPI and stated that he
was not prejudiced by the untimely notice. But the trial court found that the
fourth requirement-the substitute defendant must not be a wholly new or
unrelated defendant since this would be tantamount to the assertion of a new
cause of action-had not been met because NCC and NIPI were totally unrelated
corporations. The court of appeal disagreed and reversed. The court of appeal
found that the plaintiff had intended to sue NIPI, and that this was a misnomer
case because the petition recites that the defendant is the employer of the
sandblasters, who had caused the accident by failing to remove sand and debris.
This case is a very good example of the problem that courts have in
interpreting the Ray requirement that "the substitute defendant must not be a
wholly new and unrelated defendant since this would be tantamount to the
assertion of a new cause of action." The trial court focused on the fact that the
defendants were unrelated corporations, and the court of appeal concentrated on
the fact that the plaintiff was asserting a claim against the employer of the
workers who caused his injury. Under the trial court's reasoning a plea of
prescription would be sustained even if the substitute defendant had been given
notice and would suffer no prejudice, and under the court of appeal's interpreta-
tion a plea of prescription would almost always be overruled because the plaintiff
always wants to sue the defendant responsible for his injuries.
In considering the correctness of the court's interpretation in Sonnier, it
might be helpful to compare it with Ray to see if the decisions are in accord.
At first it would seem that they are not because the plaintiff in Ray wanted to
sue the owner of Alexandria Mall and named the defendant Alexandria Mall as
a corporation, whereas in fact it was a partnership. The plaintiffs mistake went
38. 434 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1983).
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to the legal status of the owner-corporation versus partnership-and the plaintiff
had named a nonexistent entity. These facts seem to be distinguishable from
those in Sonnier, where the plaintiff intended to sue Norwood Construction
Company and did in fact sue and serve that defendant. The plaintiff's mistake
went not to the legal status of the named defendant, but to the fact that the
named and served defendant was not the employer of the workers who had
caused plaintiffs injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiff's mistake in Sonnier had
not been caused by any "smokescreen of legalistic maneuvering"39 on the part
of the defendant as it had been in Ray. But, on the other hand, in both cases the
proper defendant had received notice through the service of process of the
original petition, in Ray, because service had been made on the mall manager,
and in Sonnier because service had been made on the owner of both Norwood
Construction Company and Norwood Industrial Painting, Inc. And this seems
to be a much important point of focus because it is in accord with the purpose
of prescription, which is to give defendant timely notice of the suit so that he can
prepare a defense.40 If the court finds that the proper defendant received notice
of the action through the service of process" of the original petition so that he
is not prejudiced in preparing a defense, then it should not matter whether the
original defendant was a nonexistent entity as in Ray or an existing but incorrect
entity as in Sonnier.
INCIDENTAL ACTIONS
In Moore v. Gencorp., Inc.,42 plaintiff filed a timely wrongful death action
on May 20, 1988, on behalf of her children who were the acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased who had been killed in an accident on June
2, 1982. After an answer had been filed, the plaintiff filed an amended petition
on August 2, 1990, to name the defendant's liability insurer, and on the next day,
an intervention was filed asserting a wrongful death claim and survivor actions
on behalf of the intervenor and her children. The trial court dismissed the
intervention on an exception of prescription. On appeal the intervenor argued
that the intervention was timely because it was an incidental action, and was filed
within ninety days of the amended petition as allowed by Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 1067."' The court of appeal rejected this argument and
39. Id. at 1086.
40. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 376 So. 2d 950 (La. 1979).
41. It should be noted that service of process of the original petition may be sufficient to give
notice to the proper defendant for purposes of prescription even though it is not valid for purposes
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the proper defendant. This was the case in both Ray and
Sonnier.
42. 615 So. 2d 1092 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ granted, 619 So. 2d 556 (La. 1993).
43. La. Code of Civil Procedure article 1067 provides, "An incidental demand is not barred by
prescription or peremption if it was not barred at the time the main demand was filed and is filed
within ninety days of date of service of main demand or in the case of a third party defendant within
ninety days from service of process of the third party demand."
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held that Article 1067 was intended to enable a defendant (or third party
defendant), brought into an action after prescription would ordinarily have run,
to assert his claim against the party who had brought the action against him, as
well as against other parties. The court reasoned that the article was not
intended to allow a third party with no interest in the pending action to assert
claims that are independent of the original claims, even though those claims may
have arisen out of the same event.
The court found support for its interpretation of Article 1067 in the
legislative history of that article. As originally enacted, it referred only to
reconventional demands and was enacted to put an end to the practice of
plaintiffs' waiting until the last day of the prescriptive period to file their actions
in order to prevent the defendants from being able to assert a reconventional
demand." The article was amended to answer criticism that it did not
adequately deal With third party demands, and although the article used the word
"incidental," the purpose of the amendment was to allow only defendants or third
party defendants additional time to file their incidental actions.45 The court
concluded from this history that Article 1067 was not intended to extend the time
limits for parties who had not been sued as defendants or third party defendants
even though the article uses the broad phrase "incidental demand." As additional
support for its decision, the court found that the intervention was not an
incidental action but an independent cause of action because it was not dependent
upon, and not collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal action (citing the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of "incidental"). But on this point the Code
of Civil Procedure defines an intervention as an action filed by a third person
having an interest in a pending action to enforce a right related to or connected
with the object of the pending action against one or more of the parties to the
action.46 If the action asserted meets the definition of an intervention, then it
is an incidental action within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure.47
Although the decision of the court of appeals seems to be in accord with the
intent of Article 1067, it remains to be seen whether the supreme court, which
granted writs in this case, will affirm or whether it will apply the broad language
of the article and hold that it is applicable to any incidental demand, including
an intervention.
EXCEPTIONS
In Everything on Wheels Subaru v. Subaru South,48 the Louisiana Supreme
Court clarified when an exception of no cause may be granted in a case
44. 1970 La. Acts No. 472; see Gruber v. Perkins, 192 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
45. 1974 La. Acts No. 86.
46. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1091.
47. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1031 defines incidental demands as reconvention, cross-claims,
intervention and the demand against third parties.
48. 616 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1993).
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involving multiple causes of action. In that case, the plaintiff had asserted four
causes of action arising out of the termination of an automobile franchise
agreement. The trial court granted the defendant's exception of no cause of
action as to two of the causes of action, and the court of appeals affirmed. 49
The supreme court stated that where two or more items of damages or theories
of recovery arise out of the facts of a single transaction or occurrence, there is
only one cause of action and an exception of no cause of action should not be
granted as to part of that single cause of action. But where actions are based on
separate and distinct transactions or occurrences, then there are separate causes
of actions properly cumulated,' and an exception of no bause of action that
dismisses a separate cause of action may be granted. Having determined when
an exception of no cause of action may be granted, the court then considered
whether a judgment maintaining such an exception was appealable. On this
question, the court held that under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1915,5' a final judgment may be rendered if it dismisses some but not all of the
parties, or if the court grants a motion of summary judgment or motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Thus a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action is not an
appealable final judgment unless it results in the dismissal of a party, but such
a judgment may be subject to review through an application for supervisory
writs. This decision is important because it makes it clear when a partial
disposition of a case is a partial final judgment that must be appealed or the right
of review is lost, but it also raises the question whether Article 1915 should be
amended to include a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action in
the enumeration of appealable partial final judgments now that the supreme court
has made it clear that such an exception can only be used to dismiss separate
causes of action.
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENTS
In Derouen v. Quintana Petroleum,52 plaintiffs filed an action against three
defendants: Quintana Petroleum (USA), Inc.; Quintana Petroleum Corporation;
and Quintana Production Company. Quintana Petroleum Corporation filed a
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it was the employer of one
of the plaintiffs. The trial court granted the motion and signed a judgment
dismissing claims against Quintana Petroleum (USA), Inc., on September 20,
1991. The plaintiffs dismissed their appeal on March 20, 1992, and in April
1992 Quintana Petroleum Corporation moved to amend the judgment to correct
the name of the defendant dismissed by the judgment. After a hearing, the trial
49. 593 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
50. La. Code Civ. P. art. 461 allows unrelated actions to be cumulated between a single plaintiff
and a single defendant.
51. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915.
52. 618 So. 2d 1238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
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court signed an amended judgment dismissing all claims against Quintana
Petroleum Corporation. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court could not
amend the judgment because the change was an alteration of substance.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 195 1" provides that a final judgment
may be amended to alter the phraseology but not the substance of the judgment.
The court of appeals held that this was not a change of substance within the
meaning of Article 1951 and affirmed the judgment. The court found that there
was never any question as to which of the defendants had filed the motion and
was entitled to be dismissed on that motion. The court considered the original
judgment to be a misnomer. This was similar to the reasoning of the trial court
that amendment of the original judgment was similar to correcting a spelling
error. But the court of appeals further stated this was not really a case of
amending a judgment because the party named in the judgment-Quintana
Petroleum (USA), Inc.-was not a party to the lawsuit, and so there was really
no judgment at all. Thus, under this reasoning, the judgment rendered on July
17, 1992, from which the appeal was taken, was the only judgment rendered on
the motion for summary judgment. The dissent considered the change of the
name of a party in a judgment to be a change of substance that could be made
only on a motion for new trial or by appeal.
Although there was disagreement as to whether this was a change of
substance, there was agreement that the original judgment did not reflect the trial
court's intention of granting the motion of the Quintana Petroleum Corporation
for a summary judgment. And it seems to be in accord with the intent of Article
1951 to find that where the judgment signed does not embody the decision of the
court through error or oversight, then the court should be allowed to correct its
mistake. There is no prejudice and no surprise because, as in this case, all
parties are aware of the mistake. On the other hand, if the judgment correctly
reflects the decision of the court, then the party seeking to change that judgment
must move for new trial or take an appeal.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Code of Civil Procedure article 197454 provides that the delay for applying
for a new trial begins to run on the day after the judgment is signed, unless
notice is required. In Delay v. Charbonnet,55 the plaintiff filed a motion for
new trial after the trial court gave oral reasons for judgment but before a
judgment was signed dismissing the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
motion for a new trial, which had been filed on October 5, 1992, was denied on
December 12, 1992, and the plaintiff took an appeal. The defendant moved to
dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the motion for a new trial was untimely,
53. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1951.
54. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1974.
55. 617 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 54
LOUISIANA CIVIL PROCEDURE
and that the delays for appeal began to run from the expiration of the period for
applying for a new trial.56 The court of appeals denied the motion to dismiss
for several reasons. First, it stated that the concept of rendition of a judgment
had not been merged entirely into the signing of the judgment and was an event
sufficiently separate from the signing of a judgment to serve as a basis for the
filing of a motion for a new trial.57 Next, the court concluded from the fact
that there had been a hearing on the motion for a new trial that the trial court
and all the parties had considered the motion for a new trial to have been made
timely. The court also found that the defendant had waived its objection by
failing to raise the issue of the timeliness of the motion for a new trial. The
court considered the possibility that the defendant had remained silent on the
issue to trap the plaintiff. The court rejected this because the implication would
have been that the defendant had intended to put the trial court to the consider-
able but pointless effort of ruling on the motion for new trial (the court noted
that it looked with a jaundiced eye at any attempt to trifle with the resources of
the judicial system).58
The result reached by the court may be correct, but the court's reasons for
its judgment raise serous questions. It is true, as the court stated, that the Code
of Civil Procedure in some of its official comments speaks of rendering a
judgment, but it is also true that the Code makes it very clear that the important
act is the signing of a final judgment. Article 1911 states that every final
judgment shall be signed, and that no appeal may be taken until the judgment is
signed. The signing of the final judgment, or notice of the signing, begins the
delays for applying for a new trial6° and for an appeal.6 ' The use of the
concept of rendition of judgment as an alternative starting point for these delays
creates uncertainty in an area that should be clear if the rights of the parties are
to be protected. There are also questions about the court's reasoning that the
defendant waived his right to object or had lulled the plaintiff into believing that
the delays for an appeal had not run. The implication of this is that the
defendant has a duty to warn the plaintiff that his motion for new trial was
untimely and that the delays for taking an appeal are running. It is to be noted
that this situation was not the result of any action taken by the defendant, and
that the defendant is entitled to rely on the belief that the plaintiff knows the law
and will follow its requirements. Furthermore, any action by the defendant to
warn the plaintiff would raise the very serious question of whether the
defendant's attorney had breached his duty toward his client. Under our
adversary system a party is not obligated to correct the mistakes of his opponent.
56. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2087.
57. In its discussion of the concept of rendition of judgment, the court cited La. Code Civ. P. art.
1038, cmt. (b); La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915, cmt. (a); and, La. Code Civ. P. art. 1911, cmt. (a).
58. Delay, 617 So. 2d at 955.
59. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1911.
60. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1974.
61. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2087, 2123.
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Surely the court is not suggesting that if the plaintiff's motion had been filed too
late, the defendant would have an obligation to notify him of that fact so that he
could take an appeal timely. But this seems to be the implication of the court's
statements about waiver and lulling the plaintiff into believing that the delays had
not begun to run.
Although there are problems with the reasoning of the court, was the
decision correct, and is there a way to harmonize the result with the requirements
of the Code? It does seem harsh to dismiss an appeal where the court gave its
oral reasons for judgment on Friday, October 2; the plaintiff moved for a new
trial on Monday, October 5; and the judgment was signed on Wednesday,
October 7. Perhaps the court should treat a premature motion for a new trial the
same way it treats a premature motion for an appeal. The Code provides that no
appeal may be taken before a final judgment has been signed,62 and the
supreme court has held that a motion for an appeal granted before the judgment
is signed is subject to dismissal until the judgment is signed. 63 And the same
could be done with a motion for new trial made before the judgment is signed.
It too would be subject to dismissal until the judgment is signed.
RES JUDICATA
In Jenkins v. State of Louisiana,64 plaintiff filed an action in state court
seeking damages under state law65 and federal law' for fraudulent conviction
of murder in 1957 and wrongful incarceration for thirty years. The case was
removed to federal court and the plaintiff's motion to remand was denied. The
plaintiff filed a second suit in state court on the same grounds while the federal
suit was pending. The federal suit was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute, which had the effect of an adjudication on the merits, 67 and based
on that judgment, the defendant filed an exception of res judicata in the state
suit. The trial court overruled the exception and the court of appeal affirmed.
The court held that exceptional circumstances justified relief from the resjudicata
effect of the judgment.68 The court found those exceptional circumstances in
the plaintiff's allegations that he had been the victim of a horrendous injustice
and concluded that the plaintiff's interest in proceeding with his suit outweighed
any interest in the strict application of res judicata, especially considering the fact
that this dismissal was the result of the attorney's conduct and not his own. The
concurring opinion noted that the exceptional circumstances exception should be
applied sparingly, but that this was a case for its application to avoid a legalistic
62. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1911.
63. Overmier v. Traylor, 475 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
64. 615 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 932 (1993).
65. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
68. La. R.S. 13:4232 (1991).
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nightmare in which the arcane procedural technicalities of the legal system
prevent the plaintiff from seeking redress for an outrageous injury inflicted on
the plaintiff by that same legal system. The dissent found no exceptional
circumstances and no injustice. The plaintiff knew that an action asserting a
claim under federal law could be removed to federal court.
This case raises some interesting questions. The first is whether the court
correctly interpreted the language of the res judicata statute that provided that "a
judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff (1) When exceptional
circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment."69 The
court found these "exceptional circumstances" in the facts that gave rise to
plaintiff's cause of action-his wrongful conviction and incarceration for thirty
years-but the statute seems to call for the court to focus on the circumstances
under which the judgment was rendered and to determine whether these
circumstances are so exceptional as to justify an exception to the application of
the principle of res judicata. The comments under the statute direct attention to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for an application of a principle similar
to that expressed in the statute and this Rule lists factors which seem to be
concerned with the rendition of the judgment, not the underlying cause of action
(e.g., mistake, newly discovered evidence, misconduct of adverse party, fraud,
judgment is void).7° This would seem to be the proper concern because the
issue is whether the judgment should be given its normal effect, not whether the
plaintiff has a cause of action that arises out of exceptional circumstances. But
the more serious question is whether this issue is to be decided by Louisiana law.
The first judgment was rendered by a federal court on a federal cause of action,
and in such a case the res judicata effect of a federal judgment is to be decided
by federal law.71
69. Id.
70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
71. See Reeder v. Succession of Palmer Nos. 92-C-2965, 92-C-3002, 1993 WL 335330 (La.
1993). and cases cited therein.
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